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economy in the early 1990s.  They use firm-level panel data sets from the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia to estimate dynamic employment
equations for the period from immediately before to immediately after the start
of transition.  For the most part, firms appear to have been quick to adjust
employment to wage levels, and there is little evidence of labor hoarding.  There
were important cross-country variations in the determinants of employment during
the reform process, however.  Hungarian and Polish firms started the transition
already substantially reformed, and became even more responsive to market signals
as transition proceeded.  In contrast, firms in the Czech and Slovak Republics started
in the completely unresponsive mode characteristic of central planning, but rapidly
caught up with their counterparts in Hungary and Poland.
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n this paper we present a comparative
analysis of the employment behavior of
firms as they moved from the communist
economic system of the late 1980s into the
transition to a market economy in the early
1990s.  Large panels of annual data on
industrial enterprises in the Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia are used
to explore employment determination at
the enterprise level, across countries and
with the change in the economic system.
Dynamic labor demand equations are esti-
mated using two-year panels with firm-level
data for these Central European countries
before and during the transition from cen-
tral planning.
In our analysis, we address some impor-
tant questions that have arisen in the de-
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bate about the nature of the centrally
planned system and the subsequent transi-
tion to a market economy.  The first con-
cerns the extent to which significant inter-
country differences existed in the behavior
of firms under the communist system up to
late 1980s and whether these differences
began to disappear after the transition was
launched.  An influential school of thought
has argued, but not proved with micro data,
that the behavior of firms in Hungary and
to a lesser extent Poland in the pre-transi-
tional period reflected the decentralizing
reforms of the previous decade, while firms
in the Czech Republic and Slovakia oper-
ated under a classical communist system of
central planning (World Bank 1996).
We also investigate whether and to what
extent firms in the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland, and Slovakia hoarded labor
or allocated labor efficiently from a private
or social standpoint.  We test whether firms
in these economies operated on the labor
demand curve or on a more labor-intensive
contract curve and whether their behavior
changed systematically as they moved from
central planning into the transition pe-
riod.  In terms of the economics of transi-
tion, we provide the first systematic evi-
dence testing the widely maintained as-
sumption that under communism firms
hoarded labor and thus entered the transi-
tion with excess employment.  Many theo-
retical models of the transition, for instance,
assume that communist firms enter the tran-
sition with excess labor and that enterprise
restructuring should therefore initially con-
sist of labor shedding.  (See, for example,
Aghion, Blanchard, and Burgess 1994;
Blanchard and Kremer 1997.)
Finally, we explore the relative perfor-
mance of newly established (de novo) and
existing state-owned firms.  The establish-
ment of new firms is widely viewed as a key
ingredient of a successful transition pro-
cess since, in comparison with the state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), the de novo firms
are considered to be more market-oriented
and to operate under hard budget con-
straints.  (See, for example, World Bank
1996; EBRD Transition Report 1998, 1999.)
Our Czech and Slovak data permit us to
examine whether the SOEs behaved differ-
ently from the de novo firms, with the latter
category being composed of start-ups and
spinoffs.
Communism and its accompanying sys-
tem of central planning constituted some
of the most important economic phenom-
ena of the twentieth century.  By analyzing
how firms behaved under the communist
system and during the transition process to
a market economy, we provide an under-
standing of this phenomenon, as well as
new insights into the functioning of the
market system that we otherwise observe
only in a mature steady state.  Because the
economies of Central Europe were the first
to enter the transition process and repre-
sent diverse cases in terms of initial condi-
tions, policies, and outcomes, our com-
parative approach provides important in-
formation for policy-makers in these econo-
mies as well as those in all the other post-
communist countries that launched their
transitions later.
Preliminary Descriptive
Statistics:  The Early Transition
All the former Soviet bloc economies
experienced a large fall in output and em-
ployment in the first few years of the transi-
tion (for some of the hypotheses and evi-
dence, see, for example, Rodrik 1994;
Kornai 1995; Blanchard and Kremer 1997).
As may be seen from Table 1, the four CEE
economies that we study experienced simi-
lar (17.5–20.5%) cumulative declines in
estimated GDP in the early 1990s, but re-
sponded very differently in terms of em-
ployment and wage adjustment.  In the
Czech Republic, employment declined by
only 9% but real product wages fell by 24%
in the 1990–92 period.1  In contrast, in
Hungary employment declined by 20.5%
but real product wages actually increased
by 17.3%.  Poland took a middle way, with
employment decreasing by 11% and wages
1Real product wages are defined as nominal wages
deflated by the producer price index.
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by 0.5%.  Finally, Slovakia experienced the
most profound decline in GDP (20.5%)
and registered a substantial fall in both
employment and wages (13.5% and 21%,
respectively).
It is important to put these figures into
the context of hardening budget con-
straints.  Table 1 shows that government
subsidies were reduced to the range of 3–
6% of GDP in all four countries in the early
1990s.2  However, Czechoslovakia started
transition with a much higher level of sub-
sidies (25% of GDP) than Hungary or Po-
land.  The more severe wage-employment
adjustment in the Czech and Slovak Repub-
lics may be in part the result of their more
precipitous decline in enterprise subsidies
during the early 1990s.  Moreover, since
Slovakia was receiving cross-subsidies within
Czechoslovakia, the fact that the most se-
vere decline in employment and wages is
observed in Slovakia probably reflects the
more substantial subsidy reduction in that
republic.  The unemployment data in Table
1 show the unemployment rate rising from
zero to double digits in Hungary, Poland,
and Slovakia, but remaining at or below 4%
in the Czech Republic in the early 1990s.
The greater rise in unemployment in Hun-
gary and Poland is consistent with the find-
ing, reported later, that these countries
opted for a more pronounced reduction in
employment than in wages.  Slovakia also
reduced wages dramatically, though some-
what less than the Czech Republic, and it
experienced the strongest negative output
shock among the four countries.  It suf-
fered a decline in employment and a rise in
unemployment, in part perhaps also be-
cause of the disproportionate reduction in
subsidy (see Ham, Svejnar, and Terrell
1998).
The employment and wage behavior of
firms in the transition economies is also an
important factor in the political economy
of the reform.  Countries with large in-
creases in unemployment—Hungary, Po-
land, and Slovakia—experienced a swift
negative political response.  The first post-
Table 1.  Comparative Macroeconomic Statistics.
GDP Growth a Change in Employment
Country 1989 1990 1991 1992 1990–92 b 1989 1990 1991 1992 1990–92b
Czech Republic 1.4 –0.4 –11.7 –7.3 –18.5 –0.1 –0.9 –5.5 –2.6 –8.9
Slovakia 1.4 –0.4 –14.6 –6.5 –20.5 –0.2 –0.8 –7.9 –5.3 –13.5
Hungary 0.7 –3.5 –11.9 –3.0 –17.5 –0.6 –3.1 –9.6 –9.3 –20.5
Poland 0.2 –11.6 –7.6 2.6 –18.1 –0.8 –6.2 –3.9 –3.1 –10.6
Country Change in Real Product Wages c Subsidies to Enterprises (%GDP) Unemployment d
1989 1990 1991 1992 1990–92 b 1989 1990 1991 1992 1989 1990 1991 1992
Czech Republic 2.1 –0.8 –31.5 12.0 –23.9 4.9 0.0 0.8 4.1 2.6
Slovakia 5.1 0.1 –31.0 14.5 –20.9 25.0 16.2 7.7 5.2 0.0 1.5 11.8 10.3
Hungary 2.2 4.3 0.6 11.8 17.3 12.0 9.5 7.4 5.5 0.3 1.5 7.5 12.3
Poland 25.3 –31.1 15.2 8.3 –0.5 10.6 7.7 5.1 3.3 0.0 6.3 11.8 13.6
aAt constant prices.
b1989–91 for Poland, where the transition shock occurred one year earlier.
cWages deflated by the producers’ price index.
dYear-end unemployment.
Sources:  EBRD Transition Report (1995, 1997, 1998) for GDP growth data in all countries and for employment
and wage data in Hungary and Poland; Gao and Schaffer (1998) for data on subsidies to enterprises; Ham,
Svejnar, and Terrell (1995) for employment and wage data for the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
2By the late 1990s the electoral cycle brought the
reformers back to power in some countries.
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communist governments were quickly re-
jected by voters in favor of more socially
oriented, often reformed communist, gov-
ernments in the early 1990s.  In contrast,
the low unemployment rate in the Czech
Republic coincided with that country’s first
post-communist leadership remaining sol-
idly in power until 1996 and surviving in a
weaker form until 1998.  These different
political outcomes suggest that voters in
the transition economies were sensitive
to reductions in job security and declines
in living standards, and that an under-
standing of the wage and employment
behavior of enterprises is important for




In examining the wage and employment
outcomes before and during the transition,
we use the conceptual framework depicted
in Figure 1.  (For the underlying model,
see, for example, McDonald and Solow
1981; Svejnar 1982, 1986.)  For any given
firm, the competitive labor market out-
come is given by employment L* at point A,
with the marginal revenue product of labor
RL equaling the competitive (market clear-
ing) wage Wc.  Since planners kept wages
low and sought to maintain full employ-
ment when the communist system was in-
tact, an efficient centrally planned system
with full employment may be conceptual-
ized precisely as one that induces firms to
operate at point A.  At this point, the work-
ers are paid the minimum acceptable wage
and the planners appropriate the maxi-
mum available profit, as depicted by the
iso-profit curve Π = Max.
However, in countries such as Hungary
and Poland, the communist system had
been reformed, largely as a result of pres-
sure from workers and managers, so it is
more realistic to conceptualize the work-
ings of the labor market in these economies
as bargaining between the planners, man-
agers, and workers.  Depending on the
preferences and relative power of these
three parties, the wage-employment out-
come could lie anywhere in the area AB'F'
in Figure 1.  Points B' and F' lie on the zero
profit (Π = 0) iso-profit curve and reflect
the maximization of income per worker
and employment, respectively, subject to
profit being zero and the wage being at
least Wc.  The contract curve ABB', which
corresponds to the short-run labor demand
curve of a profit-maximizing firm, reflects
outcomes with varying emphasis on wages
and profit (no emphasis on employment),
while the horizontal contract curve AFF'
corresponds to varying degrees of joint
employment and profit maximization (no
emphasis on wages above Wc).  The out-
comes C', D', and E' on the Π = 0 iso-profit
curve reflect varying degrees of emphasis
on wages and employment (subject to zero
profit).  A set of intermediate outcomes
wherein the planners appropriate a given
level of profits is depicted by the iso-profit
curve Π = α Max and the corresponding
points B, C, D, E, and F.
The socially efficient set of outcomes,
corresponding to RL = Wc and various wage-
profit combinations, lies on the vertical
contract curve ADD'.  These outcomes are
also important from an empirical stand-
point because they correspond to a situa-
tion in which the firm does not adjust em-
ployment in response to changes in the
wage, ceteris paribus.  Backward-bending
contract curves (for example, ABB' in Fig-
ure 1) imply that the firm reduces employ-
ment in response to a wage increase, while
forward-sloping contract curves (for ex-
ample, AEE') imply that wages and employ-
ment move in the same direction.3
Finally, it should be noted that the frame-
work of Figure 1 can capture the phenom-
enon of soft budget constraints.  We can
conceptualize soft budget constraints as
planners cross-subsidizing loss-making firms
from the surplus of profitable ones.  In
Figure 1, this implies the loss-making firms
operating above and the profitable firms
3Prasnikar et al. (1994), for instance, found that
firms in former Yugoslavia operated along the ACC'
curve in Figure 1.
EMPLOYMENT UNDER COMMUNISM AND IN TRANSITION 357
below the Π = 0 curve.  Firms operating at
point F" would receive a subsidy for hoard-
ing extra labor, while paying the minimum
acceptable wage Wc, while firms at E" would
also use part of the subsidy to pay a wage
above the reservation level.  Hardening of
the budget constraint, be it through elimi-
nation of subsidies, privatization, or other
means, is reflected in a leftward move for
such firms from points such as F" and E" to
the Π = 0 curve or even further to points
such as A, B, or B' on labor’s marginal
revenue product curve.
Firms in different countries are likely to
have started the transition from different
wage-employment-profit combinations, and
probably exhibited different distributions
of power among the planners, managers,
and workers.  Transition entails macro-sta-
bilization, privatization, the hardening of
budget constraints, and a redistribution of
power among the government, managers,
and workers, and since these factors dif-
fered across countries, the resulting behav-
ior of firms is likely to have evolved differ-
ently.  Given the large number of possible
changes, very strong assumptions would be
required to identify the changing prefer-
ences of the government, managers, and
workers over time.  Our goal is less ambi-
tious:  to assess whether enterprise behav-
ior pre- and post-transition reflected out-
comes consistent with being on the labor
demand curve or another contract curve,
and whether that behavior changed system-
atically as a result of the transition.
π = 0






B ' C '
D '
E '








Figure 1. Bargaining Model of Wage and Employment Determination. 
See text for explanation.
A
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In our empirical work we first derive and
estimate a dynamic labor demand equation
as characterized by ABB' in Figure 1.  We
obtain elasticity estimates in different peri-
ods under the assumption that wages are
set either exogenously (by the planners or
the market) or by the employer or through
bargaining, with the management setting
employment in a cost-minimizing way.  We
go on to derive and estimate an employ-
ment equation that includes a proxy for the
reservation (alternative) wage of workers,
which permits us to interpret the estimated
coefficients as indicating whether the out-
come deviates from the labor demand curve
and hence reflects bargaining over both
wages and employment.
In estimating the labor demand equa-
tion, we use the specification
(1) L = L(W/P,Q,X),
where L = number of employees, W = the
nominal wage, P = the product price index,
Q = the sales or output of the firm, and X =
a vector of ownership, legal status, and
industry dummy variables that may affect
the firm’s demand for labor.  The specifica-
tion in equation (1) corresponds to a labor
demand function of an enterprise charac-
terized by cost minimization subject to an
exogenously given level of output.  This
approach has been used frequently in stud-
ies of Western economies and it is useful as
a starting point in our analysis.4  In fact, the
assumption of exogenously set output is
arguably more realistic in our setting than
in the West, since firms in Central Europe
were probably output-constrained as a re-
sult of the dramatic output fall that re-
sulted from the imposition of restrictive
macroeconomic policies in the late 1980s
and 1990s and the disbanding of the com-
mon trading area of the Soviet bloc in 1991.
Assuming that wages were set exog-
enously to the firm by the planners and
later by the market and government wage
controls, one could estimate equation (1)
by ordinary least squares.  However, the
wage variable we use is constructed by di-
viding the wage bill by employment, which
creates the potential for measurement er-
ror.  Because of this problem of measure-
ment error, and the possibility that employ-
ers had some latitude in setting wages (wages
being endogenously determined), we in-
strument wages.  We also test whether the
negative output shock imposed an exog-
enous output (sales) constraint on firms.
In the employment equation we therefore
instrument wages and test whether sales are
to be treated as exogenous by the Hausman
test for exogeneity.
The instrumental variables that we use
are district dummy variables, two-digit in-
dustry dummy variables, preceding year
value of enterprise assets interacted with
industry dummy variables, firm ownership,
and the current and lagged average values
of sales, wages, and employment of firms in
the neighboring three-digit industry, as well
as the average value of lagged assets of firms
in the neighboring three-digit industry.  The
neighboring three-digit industry is the next
three-digit industry in relation to the indus-
try the firm belongs to, within the same two-
digit industry classification.  In the case of
the last three-digit industry in the two-digit
classification, the three-digit industry clas-
sification that is the most similar is chosen.
The district-level dummy variables are used
as instruments because wages and changes
in wages varied across districts in response
to changes in the cost of living and other
compensating differentials, while technol-
ogy is likely to have been invariant across
districts.5  The industry and regional dummy
variables are also used as instruments to
capture factors such as the technical and
managerial error components of the un-
derlying production function (Zellner,
Kmenta, and Dreze 1966).  Finally, by using
4For examples of Western analyses using this frame-
work, see, for example, Hamermesh (1986, 1993) and
Quandt and Rosen (1989).
5In the medium and long run firms would presum-
ably adjust location in response to regional wage
differentials, but this phenomenon is absent in the
short span of two consecutive years.
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as instruments the average values of vari-
ables from firms in the nearest three-digit
industry within the same two-digit classifi-
cation, we capture the effect of common
external shocks to similar sub-industries
within a given two-digit industry, while
avoiding the correlation between the error
term and regressors that may be brought
about by the firm fixed effects and three-
digit industry fixed effects (Kmenta
1997:360).6
In estimating equation (1), we use a dy-
namic specification and estimate on con-
secutive two-year panels of data.  Using a
dynamic specification is desirable since tran-
sition is inherently a dynamic process and it
would be unrealistic to assume complete
adjustment of variables within a one-year
period.  We use consecutive two-year panels
because of the high incidence of enterprise
entry, break-ups, and exit.  In particular, we
would lose most Czech and Slovak observa-
tions if we used panels longer than two
years.  Using the short panels also allows us
to assess how the behavior of firms changed
from the pre-transition period into the vari-
ous phases of the early transition.  For each
country we therefore use consecutive two-
year panels of data and test for the stability
of coefficients across the two-year periods.
We specify equation (1) in a log-linear
form and introduce a general dynamic
framework by allowing the left-hand-side
variable and all the principal right-hand-
side variables to enter in both current and
one-year lagged form.  (See, for example,
Hendry and Mizon 1978; Nickell 1986; Es-
trin and Svejnar 1993.)  This first-degree
general distributed lag model is specified
for equation (1) as7
(1') lnLt = α0 + α1ln(W/P)t +
α2ln(W/P)t–1 + α3lnQ t + α4lnQ t–1 +
α5lnXt + α6lnXt–1 + α7lnLt–1.
In equation (1'), the short-term elasticity of
employment with respect to the wage is
given by α1.  We construct the correspond-
ing long-run elasticity as the ratio of the two
relevant polynomials in the lag operator
(α1 + α2)/(1 – α7) and check for the stan-
dard error of this statistic based on the
covariance matrix of the underlying coeffi-
cients.  The short- and long-run employ-
ment elasticities with respect to output and
the other variables are defined analogously.8
Equation (1') represents a relatively gen-
eral model within which one can test if the
appropriate specification is (a) a partial
adjustment model α2 = α4 = α6 = 0, (b) a
static model α2 = α4 = α6 = α7 = 0, or (c) a
(first difference) fixed effects model α2 =
–α1, α4 = –α3, α6 = –α5, and α7 = 1.  In this
sense, our specification is more flexible
than those found in many other studies.  In
our empirical work, we test and in most
cases reject the above restrictions.
In the second step of our empirical inves-
tigation, we allow for bargaining over both
wages and employment, with the contract
curve deviating from the marginal product
curve of labor in relation to the weight that
the bargainers place on employment rela-6The Hausman test warranted the instrumenting
of the sales variable in some but not all of the re-
ported regressions.  In particular, Slovakia appears to
have been the most output-constrained of all the
countries, as we cannot reject the hypothesis of
exogeneity of sales in the employment equation.  In
Hungary, output appears to have been exogenously
determined (constrained) in the pre-transition and
early transition periods, but not in the later periods.
We reject exogeneity of sales in Poland in almost all
runs, and in the Czech Republic in all runs.  Interest-
ingly, when we consider only the “balanced panel” of
266 SOEs that existed before and survived the transi-
tion in the Czech Republic, the Hausman test sug-
gests that these firms were output-constrained before
and at the start of the transition, but ceased to be so
in the later years.
7While the flexible stochastic difference equation
(1') may be viewed as an arbitrary flexible approxima-
tion to a dynamic adjustment, it may also be derived
formally from an underlying cost-minimization be-
havior of the firm (see for example, Nickell 1986 and
Bresson et al. 1992).
8Since we use two-digit industry dummy variables
as intercepts and estimate on a two-year panel of
annual data, a two-digit producer price variable P
would be collinear with the industry dummies.  We
therefore do not enter the price variable on the right-
hand side of equation (1').
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tive to wages (that is, ACC' and AEE' in
Figure 1).  In particular, following the con-
ceptual frameworks of Brown and
Ashenfelter (1986) and Prasnikar et al.
(1994), assume that worker preferences
over wages and employment are given by a
Stone-Geary function
U = k(W/P – Wa/P)αL(1–α),
where Wa is the alternative (reservation)
wage, and that the management (and pos-
sibly government) is interested in profit
π = PQ – WL – H,
where H is fixed non-labor cost.9  A Pareto-
efficient contract that equates the marginal
rate of substitution between wages and
employment in these two objective func-
tions (for example, in a Nash bargaining
context) yields the marginal revenue prod-
uct condition
PQL = W – γ(W – W
a),
where γ = (1 – α)/α is the weight that the
firm places on employment relative to
wages.  In the context of a particular pro-
duction technology (for example, CES) one
can derive an employment equation of the
form
(1") lnL = βo + β1lnQ + β2X –
σ(1 – γ)ln(W/P) – σγln(Wa/P),
where σ is the constant elasticity of substi-
tution between labor and capital in produc-
tion.  As may be seen from this employment
equation, when the firm places no weight
on employment (γ = 0), the coefficient on
the alternative wage is zero and the specifi-
cation reduces to the standard labor de-
mand equation.  When the firm places equal
weight on wages and employment (γ = 1),
the coefficient on the own wage is zero and
employment is driven by the alternative
wage.  This is the case corresponding to the
(socially efficient) vertical contract curve
ADD' in Figure 1.  For γ > 1, one obtains
forward-sloping contract curves such as AEE'
in Figure 1.
Econometrically, equation (1") repre-
sents a relatively straightforward extension
of the basic labor demand model.  We note,
however, that the ability to derive this equa-
tion and use the own and alternative wages
to identify whether the firm is on or off the
demand curve depends on the particular
assumptions one makes about worker pref-
erences.  We use an approach that is similar
to that of Brown and Ashenfelter (1986),
but as MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986)
showed, some classes of worker objective
functions do not lend themselves to this
derivation.
The main issue in implementing equa-
tion (1") empirically is how to approximate
the alternative wage.  A number of ap-
proaches have been adopted in Western
studies, ranging from employing wages in
particular regions or sectors and assuming
that the alternative wage is proportional to
them, to using a local unemployment rate
that lowers the alternative wage by exerting
downward pressure on wages and decreas-
ing the probability of obtaining employ-
ment.10  In this paper, we follow Brown and
Ashenfelter (1986) and postulate that the
alternative wage is an inverse linear func-
tion of local unemployment and industry
dummy variables.  We select this approach
for two reasons.  First, we have accurate
district-level data (regional data in Poland)
on local unemployment.  Second, unlike
the mildly varying unemployment rates in
mature market economies, our data cover
the period when unemployment first ap-
peared and the unemployment rate rose
sharply and unevenly across districts.  In-
deed, during the period of our study, the
district-level unemployment rates varied in
all countries from near zero to well over
9The government may also be interested in em-
ployment generation, in which case its objective is
congruent with that of workers (Prasnikar et al. 1994).
10Note that the alternative wage is given by a
weighted average of alternative incomes and the un-
employment rate is the weight attached to the rela-
tively low income associated with an unemployment
state.
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20%.  We hence feel that using the local
unemployment rate is more appropriate
than trying to construct other, less accurate
proxy measures of the alternative wage.  As
with equation (1'), we estimate equation
(1") in the general distributed lag form and
we include the vector of control variables
X.
Like most large firm-level data sets, our
data come in annual rather than quarterly
or monthly frequency.  The obvious disad-
vantage is that annual data contain aggre-
gation over time that smooths short-term
changes in variables.  Moreover, the need
to use short panels prevents us from using
more than one lag of variables in our speci-
fication.  While the first-degree distributed
lag specification may be limiting in some
contexts,11 this is a shortcoming that we
simply cannot overcome in view of the se-
vere loss of observations that we would face
if we were to use longer panels of data.
Data and Summary Statistics
We use annual data from industrial en-
terprises in four transition economies:  the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and
Hungary.  These were collected from
records that, under communism, enter-
prises were legally required to submit to the
relevant National Statistical Offices and
Ministries of Finance.  The Czech, Slovak,
and Polish data sets contain almost all in-
dustrial firms with 25 or more workers.
Given the paucity of small firms in planned
economies (see World Bank 1996), these
data sets provide an almost complete record
of the transition of industrial firms in three
key transition economies.  The Hungarian
data set is a large sample of industrial enter-
prises derived from the National Statistical
Office data base.  It comprises a panel of
the thousand largest Hungarian firms, of
which about 400 are industrial firms.  The
latter are the firms we use in the present
analysis.  The four data sets together pro-
vide a unique snapshot of the effect of
transition at an enterprise level that cannot
be taken forward into the mid- and late
1990s because communism’s demise ended
the requirement for enterprises to supply
such detailed information to the govern-
ments.
Annual summary statistics for the firm-
level as well as more aggregate variables
used in the analysis are given in Table 2.
The data cover the period 1989–93 for the
Czech Republic, 1989–92 for Slovakia,
1988–91 for Poland, and 1988–92 for Hun-
gary.  In Poland and Hungary, the transi-
tion was launched at the start of 1990;12 in
the Czech and Slovak Republics, on Janu-
ary 1, 1991.  For the Czech and Slovak data
our estimates hence cover the pre-transi-
tion period of 1989–90, the start of the
transition (big bang) in 1990–91, and the
early transition (1991–92 and 1992–93 for
the Czech Republic, and 1991–92 for
Slovakia).  For Hungary and Poland, the
estimates cover the pre-transition period of
1988–89, the start of the transition in 1989–
90, and the early transition in 1990–91.
The summary statistics in Table 2 yield
useful insights that are relevant for our
analysis.  First, the average number of em-
ployees per firm held steady in Poland dur-
ing the entire 1988–90 period and declined
only one year after the big bang event.  In
contrast, average employment per firm
started declining in the Czech and Slovak
Republics and Hungary as soon as the tran-
sition began, and the decline continued as
the transition proceeded.  In the case of the
Czech Republic and Slovakia, the pattern is
influenced more strongly by a major wave
of break-ups and spin-offs of firms that
occurred at the end of 1990 and in 1991,13
11Nickell (1986), for instance, showed that if firms
optimize over inputs that are aggregated in the data
(for example, skill categories of labor), it may be
appropriate to include additional lags of the depen-
dent variable in the employment equation.
12In Hungary, the reform process dates as far back
as 1968 and the transition changes that occurred at
the end of the 1980s and early 1990s were hence less
fundamental than those in the other countries (see,
for example, Kornai 1995).
13See Lizal, Singer, and Svejnar (2001) for an
analysis of these break-ups and spin-offs.
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while in Hungary there was relatively more
emphasis on layoffs.  The steady employment
level in the Polish data may be partly ac-
counted for by the fact that Poland did not
create the same giant enterprises as did
Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the 1980s.
Moreover, we observe that the price liberal-
ization associated with the end of the cen-
trally planned system resulted in price jumps
that the workers were able to transmit rapidly
into corresponding nominal wage increases
in the more reformed economies (Hungary
and Poland) but not in the more traditional
communist economies (the Czech Republic
and Slovakia).  Indeed, in the latter countries
it took several years for workers to overcome
the major declines in real wages that oc-
curred at the start of the transition.
Econometric Results
We commence with our estimates of the
labor demand model specified in equation
(1').  The principal estimated coefficients
based on equation (1') are reported in
Tables 3 and 4.  The estimated equations
have good fits (with an R2 between 0.96 and
0.99) and the test results indicate that the
restrictions implied by the first difference
specification are usually rejected by the
data.  Results of unreported tests also indi-
cate that parameter restrictions related to
partial and complete adjustment models
are usually rejected, as is the hypothesis
that parameter estimates do not differ across
the consecutive two-year periods.  The re-
sults of the Hausman tests differ between
countries and suggest that firms in the Czech
Republic and Poland were relatively un-
constrained in selecting the level of output,
while firms in Hungary were constrained in
the early but not later periods, and firms in
Slovakia were constrained most of the time.
Table 2.  Sample Statistics.
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
Statistic 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Czech Republic
Avg. Monthly Wage (000 Kcs) — 3.16 3.27 3.78 4.38 5.37
(0.39) (0.39) (0.62) (0.93) (1.22)
Real Product Wage (000 Kcs) — 3.16 3.14 2.13 2.24 2.42
Avg. Number of Employees — 1887 1860 1186 755 716
(4,901) (4,753) (3,106) (2,220) (1,966)
Hungary
Avg. Annual Wage (000 Fl) 110 138 184 249 — —
(32) (49) (82) (120)
Real Product Wage (000 Fl) 110 126 137 140 — —
Avg. Number of Employees 1,735 1,701 1,507 1,214 — —
(6,551) (6,698) (6,509) (6,096)
Poland
Avg. Annual Wage (000 Zloty) 2.48 9.69 47.39 106.33 — —
(2.76) (10.31) (49.32) (125)
Real Product Wage 2.48 3.02 2.31 3.57 — —
Avg. Number of Employees 726 694 702 576 — —
(1,315) (1,271) (1,293) (1,104)
Slovakia
Avg. Monthly Wage (000 Kcs) — 3.11 3.22 3.73 4.28 —
(0.32) (0.36) (0.56) (1.07)
Real Product Wage (000 Kcs) — 3.11 3.07 2.11 2.30 —
Avg. Number of Employees — 1,663 1,597 980 766 —
(1,922) (1,866) (1,819) (1,625)
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As may be seen from Table 3, while the
long-term labor elasticity estimates with
respect to sales are similar and close to
unity in three of the four countries we
study, the short-term elasticity estimates
show a strikingly varied pattern.  The Czech
and Slovak firms registered very low short-
term labor demand elasticities with re-
spect to sales before and at the very start
of the transition.  In contrast, the Polish
and Hungarian elasticity estimates (0.3
and 0.6 respectively) indicate that firms
in these more market-oriented commu-
nist economies were already somewhat
responsive in their employment adjust-
ment to changes in sales in the 1988–89
pre-transition period.
Moreover, we observe a rise in the esti-
mated short-term labor demand–sales elas-
ticities in all four Central European coun-
tries shortly after the start of the transition.
In particular, the elasticity rose to 0.3 in
Slovakia by 1991–92 (after a temporary
decline during the big bang of 1990–91)
and from 0.5 to 0.6 in the Czech Republic
in the 1991–93 period.  In Hungary and
Poland one observes a temporary decline
in the estimated elasticities at the start of
the transition followed by a rise.  Hence,
while the pre-transition responsiveness of
Table 3.  IV Employment Elasticities with Respect to Sales.
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Elasticity 1988–89 1989–90 1990–91 1991–92 1992–93
Czech Republic
Short-Run –0.022 0.119*** 0.591*** 0.495***
(0.035) (0.030) (0.064) (0.057)
Long-Run n.a. 0.936*** 0.944*** 0.894***
(0.031) (0.093) (0.046)
R2=0.99 R2=0.99 R2=0.97 R2=0.99
N=761 N=990 N=1,453 N=1,017
Slovak Republic
Short-Run 0.101*** 0.063* 0.328***
(0.015) (0.035) (0.027)





Short-Run 0.229*** 0.153*** 0.187***
(0.021) (0.013) (0.006)





Short-Run 0.604* 0.236* 0.650*** 0.459***
(0.349) (0.129) (0.168) (0.097)
Long-Run n.a. 0.721 0.768*** 0.836***
(0.475) (0.096) (0.238)
R2=0.99 R2=0.96 R2=0.97 R2=0.97
N=418 N=398 N=396 N=363
n.a. = Not applicable since the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is close to unity.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level;  **at the .05 level;  ***at the .01 level.
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employment to sales was greater in the
more market-oriented economies (Poland
and Hungary) than in the more traditional
centrally planned economies (the Czech
and Slovak Republics), the difference dis-
appeared shortly after the start of the tran-
sition.
The estimated labor demand elasticities
with respect to wages are reported in Table
4.  The short-term elasticities suggest that
in the pre-transition period the Czech and
Slovak firms were at least as responsive in
adjusting employment to wages as were their
Polish and Hungarian counterparts.  The
Czech and Slovak pre-transition elasticities
range between –0.33 and –0.39, while the
Polish point estimate stands at –0.4.  The
estimate for Hungary is –0.35 but is not
statistically significant.  The Czech estimate
becomes statistically insignificant and the
Slovak one temporarily reverses sign dur-
ing the big bang of 1990–91, but both be-
come negative and statistically significant
thereafter.  Once again, one finds that
shortly after the start of the transition, the
wage elasticities of labor demand were nega-
tive and statistically significant in all four
CEE economies.  As we discuss below, it is
interesting to note that the Slovak estimate
(0.25) is lower than that found for the
other three CEE economies (0.57 to 0.96).
Our findings with respect to the labor
Table 4.  IV Employment Elasticities with Respect to Wages.
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Elasticity 1988–89 1989–90 1990–91 1991–92 1992–93
Czech Republic
Short-Run –0.389* –0.108 –0.959*** –0.611***
(0.208) (0.217) (0.216) (0.189)
Long-Run n.a. –1.190** –0.464 –0.509
(0.553) (1.380) (.932)
R2=0.99 R2=0.99 R2=0.97 R2=0.99
N=761 N=990 N=1,453 N=1,017
Slovak Republic
Short-Run –0.329*** 0.403* –0.249*
(0.116) (0.222) (0.150)





Short-Run –0.401*** –0.477*** –0.573***
(0.030) (0.019) (0.020)





Short-Run –0.352 –0.169 –0.352 –0.829***
(0.231) (0.196) (0.255) (0.339)
Long-Run n.a. 5.164 –4.762*** –5.023
(3.674) (2.038) (3.132)
R2=0.99 R2=0.96 R2=0.97 R2=0.97
N=418 N=398 N=396 N=363
n.a. = Not applicable since the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is close to unity.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level;  **at the .05 level;  ***at the .01 level.
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demand elasticities are interesting in the
context of Table 1, which shows a double-
digit unemployment rate in Hungary, Po-
land, and Slovakia post-transition, as com-
pared to 3–4% in the Czech Republic.  The
positive estimated elasticities of employ-
ment with respect to sales suggest that the
fall in employment in all countries was
associated with the decline in output.  How-
ever, the path of wages had a differential
effect across the four countries.  In the
Czech and Slovak Republics, where real
wages fell, the negative employment-wage
elasticity mitigated the output-driven de-
cline in employment, and the mitigating
effect would have been larger in the Czech
Republic, where the estimated employment-
wage elasticity is higher than in Slovakia.  In
Hungary, rising wages would have contrib-
uted to the employment decline.  Finally, in
Poland, where real wages were fairly con-
stant over the first three years and increased
only in 1991, the wage effect on employ-
ment would have been minimal.  These
effects are broadly consistent with the macro
data presented in Table 1.
In Table 5 we report estimates of employ-
ment elasticities with respect to own wage
and local unemployment rate.  These esti-
mates correspond to the contract curve
model, given by the dynamic employment
equation (1"), with the local unemploy-
ment rate proxying for the tightness of the
local labor market and hence the alterna-
tive (reservation) wage Wa.  We find the
estimated own wage coefficients to be usu-
ally negative and statistically significant,
but the estimated coefficients on local un-
employment are almost always statistically
insignificant.  In fact, the unemployment
coefficient is positive and statistically sig-
nificant only in the Czech Republic during
its big bang year of 1990–91.  In all other
cases, the unemployment coefficient is sta-
tistically insignificant, occasionally display-
ing a negative sign.  Our findings therefore
suggest that at the very start of the transi-
tion, only the Czech firms operated to the
right of their labor demand curves.  The
Czech estimate corresponds to an outcome
on the vertical contract curve (ADD' in
Figure 1), which suggests that labor alloca-
tion was socially efficient.  However, in
Poland and Slovakia during the big bang,
and in all countries (including the Czech
Republic and Hungary) during the subse-
quent years, the data generate estimates
corresponding to an outcome on the de-
mand curve for labor.
In sum, our estimates of equation (1")
suggest that outcomes to the right of the
demand curve were rare as the CEE coun-
tries moved from the pre-transition period
to the early transition period.  Moreover, as
soon as these economies started adjusting
to the shock of price liberalization, reduc-
tion of subsidies, and loss of markets, the
evidence suggests that they started operat-
ing on their labor demand curves.  In terms
of econometric specification, this finding
provides support for the labor demand
specification of equation (1') during the
transition period.
State-Owned
Enterprises versus New Firms
While the Polish and Hungarian data
sets for the most part contain the same
firms during the entire time period, the
Czech and Slovak data reflect the entry of
new firms and break-ups of existing firms.
This high turnover of firms in the Czech
and Slovak Republics enables us to check
whether the SOEs that existed before and
survived into the transition behaved differ-
ently from the de novo firms.  One might
hypothesize on the basis of other compari-
sons in the performance of state-owned
and private firms that the former would be
less flexible and respond less to market
signals (see Estrin 2002).
In Table 6, we report estimated labor
demand elasticities that correspond to
employment equation (1"), with the wage,
sales, and local unemployment elasticities
for the SOEs being measured relative to
those of the non-SOEs.  In the Czech Re-
public we find that in setting employment
the SOEs were more responsive than the
other firms to wages and sales, but not
unemployment, during the big bang of
1990–91.  However, one cannot reject the
hypothesis that the employment elasticities
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Table 5.  IV Employment Elasticities with Respect to Wages and Unemployment.
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Elasticity 1989–90 1990–91 1991–92 1992–93
Czech Republic
Wage –0.074 –1.030*** –0.472**
(0.209) (0.227) (0.208)

























*Statistically significant at the .10 level;  **at the .05 level;  ***at the .01 level.
of the two sets of firms become identical by
1991–92, reflecting a statistically significant
negative elasticity with respect to wages and
a statistically significant positive elasticity
with respect to sales.  In Slovakia, one can-
not reject the hypothesis that during the
big bang of 1990–91 the three employment
elasticities were pairwise identical across
the two sets of firms and not statistically
significantly different from zero.  By 1991–
92, the Slovak SOEs displayed sales and
unemployment elasticities that did not dif-
fer at a statistically significant level from
those of the non-SOEs, but they registered
a significantly more negative employment
elasticity with respect to wages than the
non-SOE firms.  Our estimates hence do
not support the hypothesis that SOEs re-
spond less flexibly to market signals in the
early transition period.  This finding is
consistent with the SOEs facing a similarly
hard budget constraint during the period
of declining output demand that charac-
terized the early transition.14
14Our unreported estimated effects of different
types of ownership and legal (corporate) status of
firms, used as control variables in the present study,
indicate that the ownership and legal status of firms
do not have strong systematic effects on employment
and wages, ceteris paribus.
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Conclusions
Using large firm-level data sets from four
countries at the time when they experi-
enced the systemic shift from central plan-
ning to a market system, we find that firms
rapidly adjusted their employment behav-
ior and started displaying employment elas-
ticities that are similar to those observed in
advanced market economies.  Enterprises
appear to have behaved as if they were on
labor demand curves, with only limited evi-
dence of labor hoarding in the planning
era.
We did find important cross-country dif-
ferences in the pattern of employment de-
termination, consistent with differences in
preconditions and transition policies.  Our
estimates of firm-level employment elastici-
ties with respect to sales suggest that firms
in Hungary entered transition substantially
reformed (having high, positive, and statis-
tically significant elasticities) and advanced
further as the transition proceeded, while
firms in Poland went into the transition less
reformed but maintained a positive and
statistically significant elasticity through the
transition years.  In contrast, firms in the
Czech and Slovak Republics started from
what could be termed a stereotypical
planned mode (zero or very small elastici-
ties with respect to sales), but caught up
quickly.
Interpreting labor hoarding as firms be-
ing to the right of the demand curve of
labor, we find it to have been the exception
rather than the rule, though the post-tran-
sition period was also characterized by in-
creased employment responsiveness to
sales, which may be connected with excess
employment under planning.  The behav-
ior of the Polish and Slovak firms during
the “big bang” year is consistent with being
on the labor demand curve, as is the behav-
ior of firms in all four economies after the
start of the transition.  Labor hoarding may
thus have been less prevalent at the end of
communism than is widely believed.
In the Czech Republic, we find that in
setting employment the state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs) were more responsive than
the de novo firms to wages and sales, but not
to unemployment, at the very start during
the big bang, and that the employment
elasticities of the two sets of firms became
indistinguishable later on.  In Slovakia, the
employment elasticities of the SOEs were
indistinguishable from those of the de novo
firms during the big bang, but the SOEs
displayed a statistically significantly more
negative employment elasticity with respect
to wages than the de novo firms later on.
The employment behavior of the Czech
SOEs during the early transition is hence
indistinguishable from that of the de novo
firms, while the Slovak SOEs exhibited
greater employment adjustment with re-
Table 6.  IV Elasticities and SOEs.
































*Statistically significant at the .10 level;  **at the
.05 level;  ***at the .01 level.
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